In many organisations today, IT security is a battleground: to manage the risks the organisation faces, security specialists devise policies and deploy security mechanisms that they expect staff and customers to comply with. But most of time, staff and customers don’t comply, and attempts to change that by “raising awareness” and “educating” them generally fail. The talk will use the examples of security warnings, access control, and sandboxing to explain the different perspectives and values that security specialists and ‘the rest of us’ apply to security. In conclusion, I will argue that a value-centred design approach is the only way to develop security solutions people want to use.
Organisational policies are intended to promote a unified approach to security, one that all the organisation’s employees are expected to follow. If security procedures and mechanisms are unusable, policies risk being seen as impossible to follow, or may be sidelined if they lack clear relevance to business goals. This can result in deliberate or unwitting non-compliance, and workarounds to prescribed procedures.
Organisations may promote security champions, as local representatives to promote policy in their part of the organisation. However, these security champions can be effective only if policy is workable. Encouraging ‘top down’ policy compliance assumes that policy is correct, complete, and appropriate. It also assumes that policy applies to everyone equally and that employees have no role to play in shaping effective policy. Our analysis explores the potential for employees to inform effective policies, in particular whether it was possible to (i) identify local pockets of security expertise, and (ii) target engagement with employees that involves them in the creation of workable security solutions.
Identifying security champions ‘from the ground up’
Security behaviour is driven by personal knowledge.
Technical controls enforce compliance with policy.
Ad-hoc Knowledge and Application
Shallow understanding of policy.
Knowledge absorbed from surrounding work environment.
Comprehensive knowledge and understanding of policy.
Willing policy compliance.
Role model for organisation’s security culture.
Active Approach to Security
Actively promote and advance security culture.
Intent of policy carried into work activities
Leverage well-understood values that support both security and business.
Employee security – Attitude-Levels. We studied an organisation with IT systems, so there were no participants at Level 1
A scenario-based survey was deployed in the partner company. Scenarios were based upon in-depth interviews with employees that explored security behaviours in the workplace. Each scenario involved a dilemma, where fixed options described different responses and included an element of non-compliance or an implicit cost. Participant choices indicate their Behaviour Type (above) and Attitude Level (below), which we recorded across groups of employees to characterise the security culture of the organisation and in four specific divisions. Both interviews and surveys represent a cross-section of divisions, locations, and age groups. We collected 608 survey responses; crucially, the survey allowed participants to comment on the scenarios and the available options – we also looked at 267 additional free-text comments that were provided.
Rely on self for solutions
Rely on social or group solutions
Rely on existing systems or technologies
Take a ‘naive’ approach, that their actions are not significant in creating outcomes
As researchers who strive to develop effective measures that help individuals and organisations to stay secure, we have observed the public communications that followed the Wannacry ransomware attack of May 2017 with increasing concern. As in previous incidents, many descriptions of the attack are inaccurate – something colleagues have pointed out elsewhere. Our concern here is the advice being disseminated, and the fact that various stakeholders seem to be more concerned with blaming each other than with working together to prevent further attacks affecting organisations and individuals.
Let’s start with the advice that is being handed out. Much of it is unhelpful at best, and downright wrong at worst – a repeat of what happened after Heartbleed, when people were advised to change their passwords before the affected organisations had patched their SSL code. Here is a sample of real advice sent out to staff in major organisation post-WannaCry:
“We urge you to be vigilant and not to open emails that are unexpected, unusual or suspicious in any way. If you experience any unusual computer behaviour, especially any warning messages, please contact your IT support immediately and do not use your computer further until advised to do so.”
Useful advice has to be correct and actionable. Users have to cope with dozens, maybe hundreds, of unexpected emails every day, most containing links and many accompanied by attachments, cannot take ten minutes to ponder each email before deciding whether to respond. Such instructions also implicitly and unfairly suggest that users’ ordinary behaviour plays a major role in causing major incidents like this one. RISCS advocates enlisting users as part of frontline defence. Well-targeted, automated blocking of malicious emails lessen the burden on individual users, and build resilience for the organisation in general.
In an example of how to confuse users, The Register reports that City of London Police sent out its “advice” via email in an attachment entitled “ransomware.pdf”. So users are simultaneously exhorted to be “vigilant” and not open emails and required to open an email in order to get that advice. The confusion resulting from contradictory advice is worse than the direct consequences of the attack: it enables future attacks. Why play Keystone Cyber Cops when UK National Technical Authority for such matters, the National Centre for Cyber Security, offers authoritative and well-presented advice on their website?
Our other concern is the unedifying squabbling between spokespeople for governments and suppliers blaming each other for running unsupported software, not paying for support, charging to support unsupported software, and so on, with and security experts weighing in on all sides. To a general public already alarmed by media headlines, finger-pointing creates little confidence that either party is competent or motivated to keep secure the technology on which our lives all now depend. When the supposed “good guys” expend their energy fighting each other, instead of working together to defeat the attackers, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that we are most definitely doomed. As Columbia University professor Steve Bellovin writes, the question of who should pay to support old software requires broader collaborative thought; in avoiding that debate we are choosing to pay as a society for such security failures.
We would refer those looking for specific advice on dealing with ransomware to the NCSC guidance, which is offered in separate parts for SMEs and home users and enterprise administrators.
Much of NCSC’s advice is made up of things we all know: we should back up our data, patch our systems, and run anti-virus software. Part of RISCS’ remit is to understand why users often don’t follow this advice. Ensuring backups remain uninfected is, unfortunately, trickier than it should be. Ransomware will infect – that is, encrypt – not only the machine it’s installed on but any permanently-connected physical or network drive. This problem ought to be solved by cloud storage, but it can be difficult to find out whether cloud backups will be affected by ransomware, and technical support documentation often simply refers individuals to “your IT support”, even though vendors know few individuals have any. Dropbox is unusually helpful, and provides advice on how to recover from a ransomware attack and how far it can help. Users should be encouraged to read such advice in advance and factor it into backup plans.
There are many reasons why people do not update their software. They may, for example, have had bad experiences in the past that lead them to worry that security updates will fail or leave their system damaged, or incorporate unwanted changes in functionality. Software vendors can help here by rigorously testing updates and resisting the temptation to bundle in new features. IT support staff can help by doing their own tests that allow them to reassure their users that they will help resolve any resulting problems in a timely manner.
In some cases, there are no updates to install. The WannaCry ransomware attack highlighted the continuing use of desktop Windows XP, which Microsoft stopped supporting with security updates in 2014. A few organisations still pay for special support contracts, and Microsoft made an exception for WannaCry by releasing a security patch more widely. Organisations that still have XP-based systems should now investigate to understand why equipment using an unsafe, outdated operating system is still in use. Ideally, the software should be replaced with a more modern system; if that’s not possible the machine should be isolated from network connections. No amount of reminding users to patch their systems or telling them to “be vigilant” will be effective in such cases.
It’s normally in the final seconds of a TV or radio interview that security experts get asked for advice for the general public – something simple, unambiguous, and universally applicable. It’s a fair question, and what the public want. But simple answers are usually wrong, and can do more harm than good.
For example, take the UK government’s Cyber Aware scheme to educate the public in cybersecurity. It recommends individuals choose long and complex passwords made out of three words. The problem with this advice is that the resulting passwords are hard to remember, especially as people have many passwords and use some infrequently. Consequently, they will be tempted to use the same password on multiple websites.
Password re-use is far more of a security problem than insufficiently complex passwords, so advice that doesn’t help people manage multiple passwords does more harm than good. Instead, I would recommend remembering your most important passwords (like banking and email), and store the rest in a password manager. This approach isn’t perfect or suitable for everyone, but for most people, it will improve their security.
Advice unfit for the real world
Cyber Aware also tells people not to write down their passwords, or let anyone else know them – banks require the same thing. But we know that people commonly share their banking credentials with family, for legitimate reasons. People also realise that writing down passwords is a pretty good approach if you’re only worried about internet hackers, rather than people who can get close to you to see the written notes. Security advice that doesn’t stand up to scrutiny or doesn’t fit with people’s lives will be ignored – and will discredit the organisation offering it.
Because everyone’s situation is different, good security advice should include helping people to understand what risks they should be worried about, and to take steps that mitigate these risks. This advice doesn’t have to be complicated. Teen Vogue published a tutorial on how to select and configure a secure messaging tool, which very sensibly explains that if you are more worried about invasions of privacy from people who can get their hands on your phone, you should make different choices than if you are just concerned about, for example, companies spying on you.
The Teen Vogue article was widely praised by security experts, in stark contrast to an article in The Guardian that made the eye-catching claim that encrypted messaging service WhatsApp is insecure, without making clear that this only applies in an obscure and extremely unlikely set of circumstances.
Zeynep Tufekci, a researcher studying the effects of technology on society, reported that the article was exploited to legitimise misleading advice given by the Turkish government that WhatsApp is unsafe, resulting in human rights activists using SMS instead – which is far easier for the government to censor and monitor.
The Turkish government’s “security advice” to move from WhatsApp to less secure SMS was clearly aimed more at assisting its surveillance efforts than helping the activists to whom the advice was directed. Another case where the advice is more for the benefit of the organisation giving it is that of banks, where the terms and conditions small print gives incomprehensible security advice that isn’t true security advice, instead merely a legal technique to allow the banks wiggle room to refuse to refund victims of fraud.
Within the European Union, since 2007, banks are regulated by the Payment Services Directive. This directive sets out which types of institutions can offer payment services, and what rules they must follow. Importantly for customers, these rules include in what circumstances a fraud victim is entitled to a refund. In 2015 the European Parliament adopted a substantial revision to the directive, the Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2), and it will soon be implemented by EU member states. One of the major changes in PSD2 is the requirement for banks to implement Strong Customer Authentication (SCA) for transactions, more commonly known as two-factor authentication – authentication codes based on two or more elements selected from something only the user knows, something only the user possesses, and something the user is. Moreover, the authentication codes must be linked to the recipient and amount of the transaction, which the customer must be made aware of.
The PSD2 does not detail the requirements of Strong Customer Authentication, nor the permitted exemptions to this rule. Instead, these decisions are to be made by the European Banking Authority (EBA) through Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS). As part of the development of these technical standards the EBA opened an initial discussion, to which we submitted a response based on our research on the security usability of banking authentication. Based on the discussion, the EBA produced a consultation paper incorporating a set of draft technical standards. In our response to this consultation paper, included below, we detailed how research both on security usability and banking authentication more broadly should guide the assessment of Strong Customer Authentication. Specifically we point out that there is an incorrect assumption of an inherent tradeoff between security and usability, that for a system to be secure it must be usable, and that evaluation of Strong Customer Authentication systems should be independent, transparent, and follow principles developed from latest research.
False trade-off between security and usability
In the reasoning presented in the consultation paper there is an assumption that a trade-off must be made between security and usability, e.g. paragraph 6 “Finally, the objective of ensuring a high degree of security and safety would suggest that the [European Banking Authority’s] Technical Standards should be onerous in terms of authentication, whereas the objective of user-friendliness would suggest that the [Regulatory Technical Standards] should rather promote the competing aim of customer convenience, such as one-click payments.”
This security/usability trade-off is not inherent to Strong Customer Authentication (SCA), and in fact the opposite is more commonly true: in order for SCA to be secure it must also be usable “because if the security is usable, users will do the security tasks, rather than ignore or circumvent them”. Also, SCA that is usable will make it more likely that customers will detect fraud because they will not have to expend their limited attention on just performing the actions required to make the SCA work. A small subset (10–15%) of participants in some studies reasoned that the fact that a security mechanism required a lot of effort from them meant it was secure. But that is a misconception that must not be used as an excuse for effortful authentication procedures.
Probably not too many academic researchers can say this: some of Steven Murdoch’s research leads have arrived in unmarked envelopes. Murdoch, who has moved to UCL from the University of Cambridge, works primarily in the areas of privacy and financial security, including a rare specialty you might call “crypto for the masses”. It’s the financial security aspect that produces the plain, brown envelopes and also what may be his most satisfying work, “Trying to help individuals when they’re having trouble with huge organisations”.
Murdoch’s work has a twist: “Usability is a security requirement,” he says. As a result, besides writing research papers and appearing as an expert witness, his past includes a successful start-up. Cronto, which developed a usable authentication device, was acquired by VASCO, a market leader in authentication and is now used by banks such as Commerzbank and Rabobank.
Developing the Cronto product was, he says, an iterative process that relied on real-world testing: “In research into privacy, if you build unusable system two things will go wrong,” he says. “One, people won’t use it, so there’s a smaller crowd to hide in.” This issue affects anonymising technologies such as Mixmaster and Mixminion. “In theory they have better security than Tor but no one is using them.” And two, he says, “People make mistakes.” A non-expert user of PGP, for example, can’t always accurately identify which parts of the message are signed and which aren’t.
The start-up experience taught Murdoch how difficult it is to get an idea from research prototype to product, not least because what works in a small case study may not when deployed at scale. “Selling privacy remains difficult,” he says, noting that Cronto had an easier time than some of its forerunners since the business model called for sales to large institutions. The biggest challenge, he says, was not consumer acceptance but making a convincing case that the predicted threats would materialise and that a small company could deliver an acceptable solution.
Jono and I recently presented our joint paper with Simon and Angela at the Learning from Authoritative Security Experiment Results (LASER) Workshop in San Jose, CA, USA. The workshop was co-located with the IEEE Security and Privacy Symposium. LASER has a different focus each year; in 2016, presented papers explored new approaches to computer security experiments that are repeatable and can be shared across communities.
Through our LASER paper, “Towards robust experimental design for user studies in security and privacy”, we wanted to advance the quest for better experiment design and execution. We proposed the following five principles for conducting robust experiments into usable security and privacy:
Give participants a primary task
Ensure participants experience realistic risk
Avoid priming the participants
Perform experiments double-blind whenever possible
Define these elements precisely: threat model; security; privacy andusability
Understanding users and their interaction with security is a blind spot for many security practitioners and designers. Learning from prior studies within and outside our research group, we have defined principles for conducting robust experiments into usable security and privacy. These principles are informed by efforts in other fields such as biology, qualitative research methods, and medicine, where four overarching experiment-design factors guided our principles:
Internal validity – The experiment is of “suitable scope to achieve the reported results” and is not “susceptible to systematic error”.
External validity – The result of the experiment “is not solely an artifact of the laboratory setting”.
Containment – There are no “confounds” in the results, and no experimental “effects are a threat to safety” of the participants, the environment, or society generally.
Transparency – “There are no explanatory gaps in the experimental mechanism” and the explanatory “diagram for the experimental mechanism is complete”, in that it covers all relevant entities and activities.
The release of our business whitepaper “Awareness is only the first step” was recently announced by Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE). The whitepaper is co-authored by HPE, UCL, and the UK government’s National Technical Authority for Information Assurance (CESG). The whitepaper emphasises how a user-centred approach to security awareness can empower employees to be the strongest link in defending their organisation. As Andrzej Kawalec, HPE’s Security Services CTO, notes in the press release:
“Users remain the first line of defense when faced with a dynamic and relentless threat environment.”
Security communication, education, and training (CET) in organisations is intended to align employee behaviour with the security goals of the organisation. Security managers conduct regular security awareness activities – familiar vehicles for awareness programmes, such as computer-based training (CBT), can cover topics such as password use, social media practices, and phishing. However, there is limited evidence to support the effectiveness or efficiency of CBT, and a lack of reliable indicators means that it is not clear if recommended security behaviour is followed in practice. If the design and delivery of CET programmes does not consider the individual, they can’t be certain of achieving the intended outcomes. As Angela Sasse comments:
“Many companies think that setting up web-based training packages are a cost-effective way of influencing staff behavior and achieving compliance, but research has provided clear evidence that this is not effective – rather, many staff resent it and suffer from ‘compliance fatigue.’”
The whitepaper describes a path to guide the involvement of employees in their own security, as shown in the HPE awareness maturity curve above. To change security behaviors, a company needs to invest in the security knowledge and skills of its employees, and respond to employee needs differently at each stage.
Terms and Conditions (T&C) are long, convoluted, and are very rarely actually read by customers. Yet when customers are subject to fraud, the content of the T&Cs, along with national regulations, matter. The ability to revoke fraudulent payments and reimburse victims of fraud is one of the main selling points of traditional payment systems, but to be reimbursed a fraud victim may need to demonstrate that they have followed security practices set out in their contract with the bank.
Security advice in banking terms and conditions vary greatly across the world. Our study’s scope included Europe (Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta, and the United Kingdom), the United States, Africa (Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa), the Middle East (Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Yemen), and East Asia (Singapore). Out of 30 banks’ terms and conditions studied, 26 give more or less specific advice on how you may store your PIN. The advice varies from “Never writing the Customer’s password or security details down in a way that someone else could easily understand” (Arab Banking Corp, Algeria), “If the Customer makes a written record of any PIN Code or security procedure, the Customer must make reasonable effort to disguise it and must not keep it with the card for which it is to be used” (National Bank of Kenya) to “any record of the PIN is kept separate from the card and in a safe place” (Nedbank, South Africa).
Half of the T&Cs studied give advice on choosing and changing one’s PIN. Some banks ask customers to immediately choose a new PIN when receiving a PIN from the bank, others don’t include any provision for customers to change their PIN. Some banks give specific advice on how to choose a PIN:
When selecting a substitute ATM-PIN, the Customer shall refrain from selecting any series of consecutive or same or similar numbers or any series of numbers which may easily be ascertainable or identifiable with the Customer…
Only 5 banks give specific advice about whether you are allowed to re-use your PIN on other payment cards or elsewhere. There is also disagreement about what to do with the PIN advice slip, with 7 banks asking the customer to destroy it.
Some banks also include advice on Internet security. In the UK, HSBC for example demands that customers
always access Internet banking by typing the address into the web browser and use antivirus, antispyware and a personal firewall. If accessing Internet banking from a computer connected to a LAN or a public Internet access device or access point, they must first ensure that nobody else can observe, copy or access their account. They cannot use any software, such as browsers or password managers, to record passwords or other security details, apart from a service provided by the bank. Finally, all security measures recommended by the manufacturer of the device being used to access Internet banking must be followed, such as using a PIN to access a mobile device.
Over half of banks tell customers to use firewalls and anti-virus software. Some even recommend specific commercial software, or tell customers how to find some:
It is also possible to obtain free anti-virus protection. A search for `free anti-virus’ on Google will provide a list of the most popular.
In the second part of our paper, we investigate the customers’ perception of banking T&Cs in three countries: Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom. We present the participants with 2 real-life scenarios where individuals are subject to fraud, and ask them to decide on the outcome. We then present the participants with sections of T&Cs representative for their country and ask them then to re-evaluate the outcome of the two scenarios.
Scenario 1: Card Loss
Scenario 1: Card Loss after T&Cs
Scenario 2: Phishing
Scenario 2: Phishing after T&Cs
The table above lists the percentage of participants that say that the money should be returned for each of the scenarios. We find that in all but one case, the participants are more likely to have the protagonist reimbursed after reading the terms and conditions. This is noteworthy – our participants are generally reassured by what they read in the T&Cs.
Further, we assess the participants’ comprehension of the T&Cs. Only 35% of participants fully understand the sections, but the regional variations are large: 45% of participants in the US fully understanding the T&Cs but only 22% do so in Germany. This may indeed be related to the differences in consumer protection laws between the countries: In the US, Federal regulations give consumers much stronger protections. In Germany and the UK (and indeed, throughout Europe under the EU’s Payment Service Directive), whether a victim of fraud is reimbursed depends on if he/she has been grossly negligent – a term that is not clearly defined and confused our participants throughout.
I’m very pleased to announce that — along with George Danezis and Tomaso Aste, head of our Financial Computing group — I’ve been awarded a grant to continue our work on distributed ledgers (aka “blockchain-like things”) for the next three years.
Our group has already done a lot of research in this space, including George’s and my recent paper on centrally banked cryptocurrencies (at NDSS 2016) and Jens’ paper (along with Markulf Kohlweiss, a frequent UCL collaborator) on efficient ring signatures and applications to Zerocoin-style cryptocurrencies (at Eurocrypt 2015). It’s great to have this opportunity to further investigate the challenges in this space and develop our vision for the future of these technologies, so big thanks to the EPSRC!
Anyway, the point of this post is to advertise, as part of this grant, three positions for postdoctoral researchers. We are also seeking collaboration with any industrial partners investigating the potential usage of distributed ledgers, and in particular ones looking at the application of these ledgers across the following settings (or with a whole new setting in mind!):
Identity management. How can identities be stored, shared, and issued in a way that preserves privacy, prevents theft and fraud, and allows for informal forms of identity in places where no formal ones exist?
Supply chain transparency. How can supply chain information be stored in a way that proves integrity, preserves the privacy of individual actors, and can be presented to the end customer in a productive way?
Financial settlement. How can banking information be stored in a way that allows banks to easily perform gross settlement, reduces the burden on a central bank, and enables auditability of the proper functioning of the system?
Administration of benefits. How can benefits be administered to and used by disadvantaged populations in a way that preserves privacy, provides useful visibility into their spending, and protects against potential abuses of the system?
We expect the postdoctoral researchers to work with us and with each other on the many exciting problems in this space, which are spread across cryptography, computer and network security, behavioural economics, distributed systems, usable security, human-computer interaction, and software engineering (just to name a few!). I encourage anyone interested to reach out to me (Sarah) to discuss this further, whether or not they’ve already done research on the particular topic of distributed ledgers.
That’s all for now, but please get in touch with me if you have any questions, and in the years to come I hope to invite many people to come work with us in London and to announce the various outcomes of this exciting project!