Yes, we have no receipts

Internet voting is a hard problem: there are many ways to fail, and the cost of failing is high. Furthermore, the security requirements appear to be self-contradicting at times. Verifiability requires that a voter, let’s say Alice, must have sufficient knowledge about her ballot to detect if it was tampered with, while Privacy requires that Alice’s vote remains secret, even if Alice herself is bribed or forced into revealing everything she knows.

Can we build a system that allows Alice to verify that her ballot remains unchanged, but also allows her to “forget” who she voted for?

In joint work with Véronique Cortier, Georg Fuchsbauer and David Galindo we present a solution to this problem, in the form of BeleniosRF. We use rerandomizable encryption to change how ballots are encrypted without changing their contents. Digital signatures and zero knowledge techniques ensure ballot integrity, and prevent any tampering during the rerandomization.

Verifiability and privacy

Verifiability means that there must be some way for voters to monitor the election such that they can detect foul play from other voters, or even officials. This is often split into two notions: individual verifiability, dealing with a voter monitoring the way her vote was processed (i.e. that it was not changed or simply thrown away), and universal verifiability, covering requirements for the entirety of the election (e.g. “every ballot must be valid”).

Privacy, in its simplest form, keeps the contents of a vote secret from malicious observers, or even authorities and other compromised voters. In plain terms, we don’t want hackers to decrypt votes, and we don’t allow authorities to decrypt votes when they’re not supposed to; current systems anonymize votes by shuffling or summing them before they are decrypted.

Unfortunately, the above discussion fails to cover one potential adversary: the voter herself. An adversarial voter might be fully corrupt, as in the case of a vote seller who does not value her vote apart from any potential financial gain, or simply be placed in a coercive environment where she is “encouraged” to vote the “right” way. A good voting system should aim to hinder vote sellers and protect coerced users. This might not be possible in all cases: if a voter is monitored 24/7 or simply prevented from voting, the problem may well be unsolvable.

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