Nicolas Courtois – Algebraic cryptanalysis is not the best way to break something, but sometimes it is the only option

Nicolas Courtois, a mathematician and senior lecturer in computer science at UCL, working with Daniel Hulme and Theodosis Mourouzis, has won the 2012 best paper award from the International Academy, Research, and Industry Association for their work on using SAT solvers to study various problems in algebra and circuit optimization. The research was funded by the European Commission under the FP7 project number 242497, “Resilient Infrastructure and Building Security (RIBS)” and by the UK Technology Strategy Board under project 9626-58525. The paper, Multiplicative Complexity and Solving Generalized Brent Equations with SAT Solvers, was presented at Computation Tools 2012, the third International Conference on Computational Logics, Algebras, Programming, Tools, and Benchmarking, held in Nice, France in July.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lfen7ZOIkYw

SAT (short for “satisfiability”) solvers are algorithms used to analyse logical problems composed of multiple statements such as “A is true OR not-B is true or C is true” for the purpose of determining whether the whole system can be true – that is, whether all the statements it’s composed of can be satisfied. SAT solvers also are used to determine how to assign the variables to make the set of statements true. In 2007, Bard and Courtois realised they could be used to test the security of cryptographic functions and measure their complexity, and today they are important tools in cryptanalysis; they have already been used for a long time in other applications such as verifying hardware and software. In this particular paper, Courtois, Hulme, and Mourouzis focused on optimising S-boxes for industrial block ciphers; the paper reports the results of applying their methodology to the PRESENT and GOST block ciphers. Reducing the complexity and hardware cost of these ciphers is particularly important to build so-called secure implementations of cryptography. These are particularly costly because they need to protect against additional threats such as side-channel attacks, in which the attacker exploits additional information leaked from the physical system – for example, by using an oscilloscope to observe a smart card’s  behaviour.

“It’s more a discovery than an invention,” says Courtois. “One of the amazing things SAT solvers can do is give you proof that something is not true.” The semiconductor industry provides one application of the work in this paper: these techniques promise to provide a way to test whether a circuit has been built with the greatest possible efficiency by proving that the chip design uses the smallest possible number of logic gates.

“You’ll get optimal designs and be able to prove they cannot be done better,” he says.

Classical cryptanalysis proceeds by finding approximations to the way a cipher works. Many successful academic attacks have been mounted using such techniques, but they rely on having a relatively large amount of data available for study. That works for large archives of stored data – such as, for example, the communications stored and kept by the Allies after World War II for later cryptanalysis. But in many real-world applications, it is more common to have only very small amounts of data.

“The more realistic scenario is that you’ll just have one or a few messages,” says Courtois. Bluetooth, for example, encrypts only 1,500 bits with a single key. “Most attacks are useless because they won’t work with this quantity of data.” Algebraic cryptanalysis, which he explained in New Frontier in Symmetric Cryptanalysis, an invited talk at Indocrypt 2008, by contrast, is one of the few techniques that can be hoped to work in such difficult situations.

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How Tor’s privacy was (momentarily) broken, and the questions it raises

Just how secure is Tor, one of the most widely used internet privacy tools? Court documents released from the Silk Road 2.0 trial suggest that a “university-based research institute” provided information that broke Tor’s privacy protections, helping identify the operator of the illicit online marketplace.

Silk Road and its successor Silk Road 2.0 were run as a Tor hidden service, an anonymised website accessible only over the Tor network which protects the identity of those running the site and those using it. The same technology is used to protect the privacy of visitors to other websites including journalists reporting on mafia activity, search engines and social networks, so the security of Tor is of critical importance to many.

How Tor’s privacy shield works

Almost 97% of Tor traffic is from those using Tor to anonymise their use of standard websites outside the network. To do so a path is created through the Tor network via three computers (nodes) selected at random: a first node entering the network, a middle node (or nodes), and a final node from which the communication exits the Tor network and passes to the destination website. The first node knows the user’s address, the last node knows the site being accessed, but no node knows both.

The remaining 3% of Tor traffic is to hidden services. These websites use “.onion” addresses stored in a hidden service directory. The user first requests information on how to contact the hidden service website, then both the user and the website make the three-hop path through the Tor network to a rendezvous point which joins the two connections and allows both parties to communicate.

In both cases, if a malicious operator simultaneously controls both the first and last nodes to the Tor network then it is possible to link the incoming and outgoing traffic and potentially identify the user. To prevent this, the Tor network is designed from the outset to have sufficient diversity in terms of who runs nodes and where they are located – and the way that nodes are selected will avoid choosing closely related nodes, so as to reduce the likelihood of a user’s privacy being compromised.

How Tor works
How Tor works (source: EFF)

This type of design is known as distributed trust: compromising any single computer should not be enough to break the security the system offers (although compromising a large proportion of the network is still a problem). Distributed trust systems protect not only the users, but also the operators; because the operators cannot break the users’ anonymity – they do not have the “keys” themselves – they are less likely to be targeted by attackers.

Unpeeling the onion skin

With about 2m daily users Tor is by far the most widely used privacy system and is considered one of the most secure, so research that demonstrates the existence of a vulnerability is important. Most research examines how to increase the likelihood of an attacker controlling both the first and last node in a connection, or how to link incoming traffic to outgoing.

When the 2014 programme for the annual BlackHat conference was announced, it included a talk by a team of researchers from CERT, a Carnegie Mellon University research institute, claiming to have found a means to compromise Tor. But the talk was cancelled and, unusually, the researchers did not give advance notice of the vulnerability to the Tor Project in order for them to examine and fix it where necessary.

This decision was particularly strange given that CERT is worldwide coordinator for ensuring software vendors are notified of vulnerabilities in their products so they can fix them before criminals can exploit them. However, the CERT researchers gave enough hints that Tor developers were able to investigate what had happened. When they examined the network they found someone was indeed attacking Tor users using a technique that matched CERT’s description.

The multiple node attack

The attack turned on a means to tamper with a user’s traffic as they looked up the .onion address in the hidden service directory, or in the hidden service’s traffic as it uploaded the information to the directory.

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New EU Innovative Training Network project “Privacy & Us”

Last week, “Privacy & Us” — an Innovative Training Network (ITN) project funded by the EU’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions — held its kick-off meeting in Munich. Hosted in the nice and modern Wisschenschafts Zentrum campus by Uniscon, one of the project partners, principal investigators from seven different countries set out the plan for the next 48 months.

Privacy & Us really stands for “Privacy and Usability” and aims to conduct privacy research and, over the next 3 years, train thirteen Early Stage Researchers (ESRs) — i.e., PhD students — to be able to reason, design, and develop innovative solutions to privacy research challenges, not only from a technical point of view but also from the “human side”.

The project involves nine “beneficiaries”: Karlstads Universitet (Sweden), Goethe Universitaet Frankfurt (Germany), Tel Aviv University (Israel), Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz (Germany), Uniscon (Germany), University College London (UK), USECON (Austria), VASCO Innovation Center (UK), and Wirtschaft Universitat Wien (Austria), as well as seven partner organizations: the Austrian Data Protection Authority (Austria), Preslmayr Rechtsanwälte OG (Austria), Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen (Germany), University of Bonn (Germany), the Bavarian Data Protection Authority (Germany), EveryWare Technologies (Italy), and Sentor MSS AB (Sweden).

The people behind Privacy & Us project at the kick-off meeting in Munich, December 2015
The people behind Privacy & Us project at the kick-off meeting in Munich, December 2015

The Innovative Training Networks are interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary in nature and promote, by design, a collaborative approach to research training. Funding is extremely competitive, with acceptance rate as low as 6%, and quite generous for the ESRs who often enjoy higher than usual salaries (exact numbers depend on the hosting country), plus 600 EUR/month mobility allowance and 500 EUR/month family allowance.

The students will start in August 2016 and will be trained to face both current and future challenges in the area of privacy and usability, spending a minimum of six months in secondment to another partner organization, and participating in several training and development activities.

Three studentships will be hosted at UCL,  under the supervision of Dr Emiliano De Cristofaro, Prof. Angela Sasse, Prof. Ann Blandford, and Dr Steven Murdoch. Specifically, one project will investigate how to securely and efficiently store genomic data, design and implementing privacy-preserving genomic testing, as well as support user-centered design of secure personal genomic applications. The second project will aim to better understand and support individuals’ decision-making around healthcare data disclosure, weighing up personal and societal costs and benefits of disclosure, and the third (with the VASCO Innovation Centre) will explore techniques for privacy-preserving authentication, namely, extending these to develop and evaluate innovative solutions for secure and usable authentication that respects user privacy.

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Forced authorisation chip and PIN scam hitting high-end retailers

Chip and PIN was designed to prevent fraud, but it also created a new opportunity for criminals that is taking retailers by surprise. Known as “forced authorisation”, committing the fraud requires no special equipment and when it works, it works big: in one transaction a jewellers store lost £20,500. This type of fraud is already a problem in the UK, and now that US retailers have made it through the first Black Friday since the Chip and PIN deadline, criminals there will be looking into what new fraud techniques are available.

The fraud works when the retailer has a one-piece Chip and PIN terminal that’s passed between the customer and retailer during the course of the transaction. This type of terminal is common, particularly in smaller shops and restaurants. They’re a cheaper option compared to terminals with a separate PIN pad (at least until a fraud happens).

The way forced authorisation fraud works is that the retailer sets up the terminal for a transaction by inserting the customer’s card and entering the amount, then hands the terminal over to the customer so they can type in the PIN. But the criminal has used a stolen or counterfeit card, and due to the high value of the transaction the terminal performs a “referral” — asking the retailer to call the bank to perform additional checks such as the customer answering a security question. If the security checks pass, the bank will give the retailer an authorisation code to enter into the terminal.

The problem is that when the terminal asks for these security checks, it’s still in the hands of the criminal, and it’s the criminal that follows the steps that the retailer should have. Since there’s no phone conversation with the bank, the criminal doesn’t know the correct authorisation code. But what surprises retailers is that the criminal can type in anything at this stage and the transaction will go through. The criminal might also be able to bypass other security features, for example they could override the checking of the PIN by following the steps the retailer would if the customer has forgotten the PIN.

By the time the terminal is passed back to the retailer, it looks like the transaction was completed successfully. The receipt will differ only very subtly from that of a normal transaction, if at all. The criminal walks off with the goods and it’s only at the end of the day that the authorisation code is checked by the bank. By that time, the criminal is long gone. Because some of the security checks the bank asked for weren’t completed, the retailer doesn’t get the money.

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