Understanding Online Dating Scams

Our research on online dating scams will be presented at the  Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA) that will be held in Milan in July. This work was a collaboration with colleagues working for Jiayuan, the largest online dating site in China, and is the first large-scale measurement of online dating scams, comprising a dataset of more than 500k accounts used by scammers on Jiayuan across 2012 and 2013.

As someone who has spent a considerable amount of time researching ways to mitigate malicious activity on online services, online dating scams picked my interest for a number of reasons. First, online dating sites operate following completely different dynamics compared to traditional online social networks. On a regular social network (say Facebook or Linkedin) users connect with people they know in real life, and any request to connect from an unknown person is considered unsolicited and potentially malicious. Many malicious content detection systems (including my own) leverage this observation to detect malicious accounts. Putting people who don’t know each other in contact, however, is the main purpose of online dating sites – for this reason, traditional methods to detect fake and malevolent accounts cannot be applied to this context, and the development of a new threat model is required. As a second differentiator, online dating users tend to use the site only for the first contact, and move to other media (text messages, instant messaging) after that. Although that is fine for regular use, it makes it more difficult to track scammers, because the online dating site loses visibility of the messages exchanged between users after they have left the site. Third, online dating scams have a strong human component, which differentiates them heavily from traditional malicious activity on online services such as spam, phishing, or malware.

We identified three types of scams happening on Jiayuan. The first one involves advertising of  escort services or illicit goods, and is very similar to traditional spam. The other two are far more interesting and specific to the online dating landscape. One type of scammers are what we call swindlers. For this scheme, the scammer starts a long-distance relationship with an emotionally vulnerable victim, and eventually asks her for money, for example to purchase the flight ticket to visit her. Needless to say, after the money has been transferred the scammer disappears. Another interesting type of scams that we identified are what we call dates for profit. In this scheme, attractive young ladies are hired by the owners of fancy restaurants. The scam then consists in having the ladies contact people on the dating site, taking them on a date at the restaurant, having the victim pay for the meal, and never arranging a second date. This scam is particularly interesting, because there are good chances that the victim will never realize that he’s been scammed – in fact, he probably had a good time.

In the paper we analyze the accounts that we detected belonging to the different scam types, and extract typical information about the demographics that scammers pose as in their accounts, as well as the demographics of their victims. For example, we show that swindlers usually pose as widowed mid-aged men and target widowed women. We then analyze the modus operandi of scam accounts, showing that specific types of scam accounts have a higher chance of getting the attention of their victims and receiving replies than regular users. Finally, we show that the activity performed on the site by scammers is mostly manual, and that the use of infected computers and botnet to spread content – which is prominent on other online services – is minimal.

We believe that the observations provided in this paper will shed some light on a so far understudied problem in the field of computer security, and will help researchers in developing systems that can automatically detect such scam accounts and block them before they have a chance to reach their victims.

The full paper is available on my website.

Update (2015-05-15): There is press coverage of this paper in Schneier on Security and BuzzFeed.

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